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Leidschrift, jaargang 24, nummer 2, september 2009 
In 1905 Nicholas II faced a great crisis. Assailed from all sides by rebellion 
and confronted by military defeat in war with Japan, the response of the 
Tsarist regime to revolt and the humiliation of the failure of Russia’s armed 
forces was crucial in determining the fate of the imperial Russian state. 
During 1905 Russia had to deal with the central dilemma that had faced 
Russia since the reign of Peter the Great: should the Russian state embrace 
European models, or could it modernise by pursuing its own unique pattern 
of political and social development? The proclamation of the 1905 October 
Manifesto was a turning point in the history of the Russian autocracy, as it 
appeared to demonstrate that Russia was to become a constitutional 
monarchy on the west European pattern, but Nicholas II was never able to 
reconcile himself to this new constitutional order.1 He continued to believe 
that he remained the ‘Autocrat of All the Russias’, never accepting that his 
power had been diminished. This refusal to come to terms with reality was 
to colour the remainder of Nicholas’s reign and contributed to the downfall 
of Tsarism in February 1917. 
Nicholas II’s grasp of domestic politics was shaky. Nicholas had been 
brought up to revere the ideal of autocracy and his father, the redoubtable 
Alexander III, had appeared as the personification of the concept. 
Alexander had moved sharply away from the reformist and more European-
orientated policies of Alexander II after the Tsar-Liberator’s assassination in 
1881. Alexander III’s instincts were to oppose reform and this was 
intensified by seeing his father murdered by terrorists: the result, so the new 
Tsar believed, of his father’s reforming policies. The thirteen year old 
Nicholas witnessed the accession of his father to the throne in 1881 and 
saw at first hand how reform was swept from the agenda. Tutored by 
Pobedonostsev, the arch-conservative who advised Alexander III from his 
position as Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, Nicholas was imbued with 
the highly traditional view of the nature of the Russian autocracy that was 
espoused by his father. His accession manifesto declared that ‘Our grief 
cannot be expressed in words’ and he felt unprepared for the business of 
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ruling the Russian Empire.2 The new Tsar told Grand Duke Alexander 
Mikhailovich that ‘I am not prepared to be a Tsar. I never wanted to 
become one. I know nothing of the business of ruling. I even have no idea 
how to talk to the ministers.’3 In political terms, he wanted to continue the 
policies that his father had pursued which, in Nicholas’s view, had brought 
stability to the empire. Indeed, Nicholas knew no other way of ruling. 
The new Tsar was willing to be guided by his ministers, and this 
process functioned well for much of the 1890s as Russia’s economy grew 
rapidly and Sergei Witte, the Minister of Finance, acted as the mainstay of 
government, subordinating other elements of the government machine to 
his economic priorities. Nicholas was able to learn something about the 
work of government and to gain an appreciation of the men who served 
him. This method of governing was, however, less effective when tensions 
arose about the most effective methods of ruling Russia. The resurgence of 
social discontent was brought into very sharp focus for Nicholas II in the 
summer of 1904. Within the space of six weeks, two of the Tsar’s most 
devoted advisers were assassinated. In Finland, the much-loathed governor-
general, V. I. Bobrikov, was murdered and in St Petersburg, the Minister of 
Internal Affairs, V. K. Pleve was killed by a terrorist bomb. Few people 
mourned either of these two men: Pleve was especially detested, even by his 
ministerial colleagues. Witte, cutting as ever, wrote that ‘All you could hear 
was a sigh of relief and cursing of his memory’.4 But the symbolism of these 
two assassinations was immense; they represented an assault on the 
foundations of autocracy and began to move the Russian government in the 
direction of Europe and reform.  
This was most clearly personified with the appointment of P.D. 
Sviatopolk-Mirskii as Pleve’s successor. The new Minister of Internal 
Affairs held opinions that were diametrically opposed to the reactionary 
Pleve. He saw himself as a ‘zemstvo man’ who was steeped in the traditions 
of the liberal provincial nobility and believed that the Russian government 
must develop a relationship of trust with society.5 Nicholas’s motives in 
                                                          
2 Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiisskoi imperii (PSZ) [Complete collection of laws of 
the Russian Empire] XIV, no. 11014.  
3 Alexander Mikhailovich, Once a Grand Duke (New York 1932) 169. 
4 ‘Perepiska S. Iu. Witte i A. N. Kuropatkina v 1904-1905 gg. [Correspondence of 
S.Iu. Witte and A.N. Kuropatkin in 1904-05]’, Krasnyi Arkhiv [Red Archive] 19 
(1926) 72.  
5 The zemstva were elected local councils, first established in the 1860s. 




making this appointment are unclear. For some people, such as D.N. 
Shipov, a zemstvo activist, Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s appointment to one of the 
most significant posts in the government was an unambiguous signal that 
Nicholas II had recognised the need for a fundamental shift in government 
policy. Others saw the appointment of the new minister as having little to 
do with the direction of policy, but instead as evidence of the influence of 
Nicholas II’s mother, Mariia Fedorovna, who had a particular liking for 
Sviatopolk-Mirskii. It has been suggested that the Tsar did not actually 
comprehend the step that he was taking in making this appointment and 
that Nicholas was entirely ignorant of the new minister’s opinions, simply 
seeing him as a decent and trustworthy individual.6 The new minister lost 
no time in proposing radical reforms. Sviatopolk-Mirskii wanted to 
persuade Nicholas II of the need for some form of national representative 
body.  
At the same time, Sviatopolk-Mirskii was becoming increasingly 
frustrated with the Tsar’s vacillations and his reluctance to allow his 
ministers adequate autonomy. In November 1904, a national zemstvo 
congress had taken place without government permission and the Interior 
Minister had drafted a circular to instruct provincial governors to remind 
zemstvo chairmen of the prohibition on wider political debate by the 
zemstva. The Tsar commented unfavourably on the mild tone of the 
circular, and Sviatopolk-Mirskii immediately tendered his resignation, since 
he regarded this as demonstrating Nicholas’s lack of trust in him. This 
provoked a serious rift between the Tsar and his Interior Minister: Nicholas 
refused to accept Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s resignation and indeed noted in his 
diary that it made him ‘very angry’.7 In the end, however, Nicholas prevailed 
and Sviatopolk-Mirskii withdrew his resignation.8 These events highlighted 
the fragility of the Interior Minister’s position and the way in which the 
Emperor was able to exert his authority over his ministers: the absence of 
any real form of cabinet government meant that ministers found it difficult 
                                                          
6 This is the view that Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s wife took in her published diary and is 
supported by Andrew Verner. See: ‘Dnevnik kn. Ekateriny Alekseevny Sviatopolk-
Mirskoi za 1904-1905 gg. [Diary of Princess Ekaterina Alekseevna Svaitopolk-
Mirkii for 1904-05]’, Istoricheskie zapiski [Historical Notes] 77 (1965) 241-243., and 
A. Verner, The crisis of Russian autocracy: Nicholas II and the 1905 Revolution (Princeton 
1990) 107-111. 
7 Moscow, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF) [State Archive of 
the Russian Federation], f. 601, op. 1, d. 24, l. 8, 21 November 1904.  





to provide any concerted opposition to Nicholas. Personal meetings 
between the Tsar and individual ministers determined the policy of the 
government, and there was little regular coordination of government policy. 
The emperor represented almost the only point at which all the elements of 
Russian government met and the personality and interests of the emperor 
were crucial in determining the overall shape of policy. A powerful and 
dominant minister, such as Witte, could acquire a degree of influence over 
the whole course of the Russian government’s work, but such men were 
rare and their temporary pre-eminence produced resentment and discontent 
among other ministers. Nicholas II also disliked the emergence of strong-
willed ministers who challenged his views and, while he found it difficult to 
confront them directly, he was prepared to act to weaken their positions 
and continued to harbour his resentments even after a minister had 
resigned. 
Early in December 1904, Nicholas II convened a meeting of his 
senior ministers and advisers to discuss Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s proposals for 
reform and more generally to consider how to deal with the growing 
discontent that was being manifested across the empire. This gathering 
marked the beginning of the process of intense discussion that was to lead 
to the publication of the October Manifesto in the autumn of 1905 and set 
the pattern for the debates that were to take place. Nicholas demonstrated 
his uncertainty over the process from the very beginning. He originally 
decided to exclude both Konstantin Pobedonostsev and Witte from the 
conference, on the grounds that Pobedonostsev would have nothing new to 
say and that Witte was too vague in his opinions. However, Pobedonostsev 
was too skilled a bureaucrat to tolerate his exclusion from such a significant 
gathering and ensured that his presence was belatedly requested by the Tsar, 
while Sviatopolk-Mirskii insisted that Witte, as the pre-eminent figure in 
Russian government, could hardly be prevented from contributing to the 
meeting. Nicholas reluctantly agreed to Witte’s presence.9 
The group that convened at Tsarskoe Selo at the beginning of 
December was presented with Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s proposals for a 
consultative assembly, and discussion quickly focused on the fundamental 
ideological questions that they raised. There was a powerful defence by 
Pobedonostsev of the principle of autocracy that lay at the heart of the 
Russian government, and Witte set out in stark terms the contradictions 
between autocracy and representation. This approach was highly effective in 
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persuading Nicholas that he should oppose Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s 
fundamental idea of introducing some form of representation into the 
Russian government. Nicholas was jealous of his own autocratic rights and 
was deeply resistant to make concessions that would erode his own 
authority. The spectre of a constitution that was raised by some of the 
participants in the December 1904 meeting was sufficient to persuade the 
emperor that he should oppose Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s proposals. The edict 
that was issued on 12 December 1904 as a result of this meeting made no 
mention of elected representation.10 This decision marked the effective end 
of Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s tenure of office, but his final weeks in office were 
marked by significant disasters. On 19 December, the Japanese prevailed 
over Russia’s chief base in the Far East and forced the surrender of Port 
Arthur. This was an event which profoundly affected Nicholas: unusually, 
he commented on a political matter in his diary, writing that:  
 
Grave and painful, even though it had been foreseen, but one 
wanted to believe that the army would relieve the fortress. The 
defenders are all heroes and did more than could have been 
suggested. But such is God’s will.11 
 
 While this represented an unusual degree of emotion from the emperor, 
those closest to him commented on his apparent equanimity in the face of 
military catastrophe, with even his mother remarking on him being 
‘completely calm and content’.12 
The second event to colour the end of Sviatopolk-Mirskii’s period 
in office was Bloody Sunday. On 9 January 1905 several hundred workers 
taking part in peaceful demonstrations in St Petersburg were killed or 
wounded by troops firing on them, and this acted as the spark for 
movements to emerge in other cities of the empire.13 Nicholas’s reaction to 
the massacre was typically brief. He wrote in his diary that it was, 
 
A grave day! In Petersburg serious disorders took place as a result of 
the workers’ desire to reach the Winter Palace. The troops were 
forced to fire in different parts of the city; there were many killed 
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13 W. Sablinsky, The road to Bloody Sunday. Father Gapon and the St Petersburg massacre of 





and wounded. God, how painful and distressing.  
The original demands which the demonstrators made were largely economic 
and related to their working and living conditions: better pay, shorter hours, 
the recognition of trade unions and the like.14 Such demands appeared 
wholly reasonable to a large proportion of the Russian elite, including a 
section of the government, but the view that the regime espoused was that 
making any form of material concession to these demands would only 
demonstrate that the regime was powerless and open to further pressure. 
The favoured response of the emperor was to rely on the traditional ethos 
of the Russian autocracy: to assert that it held absolute power and could 
maintain itself by force. The reaction to the demands made by the marchers 
was a half-hearted effort to set up a commission to look into the grievances 
displayed by the workers, but it foundered over its terms of reference. 
Nicholas’s main concern was to reassert the authority of the 
autocracy: he appointed the former Moscow police chief, D.F. Trepov, as 
governor-general of St Petersburg. Trepov was renowned as a stalwart of 
the autocracy and had worked in Moscow alongside the Tsar’s famously 
reactionary uncle, Grand Duke Sergei. At the same time, Nicholas finally 
accepted the resignation of Sviatopolk-Mirskii as Interior Minister, casting 
him aside without any token of appreciation for his work. His replacement 
was to be A.G. Bulygin, former governor of Kaluga and Grand Duke 
Sergei’s deputy as Moscow governor-general. Bulygin had no particular 
political axe to grind, and under his tenure the Interior Ministry became 
dominated by Trepov and by P.N. Durnovo, a sophisticated proponent of 
repressive policies.15 The refusal of the regime to meet what appeared to be 
legitimate demands with anything other than bullets and the full apparatus 
of oppression did not persuade the urban population that they should 
return to their previous quiescence and most of the large cities of the 
empire were plagued by strikes and demonstrations during 1905. 
Trouble was not confined to the cities: the links between city and 
village in Russia were very strong, as most of the new working class 
maintained their ties with their home villages. News travelled quickly back 
to the countryside and the peasantry were well aware of the difficulties 
being endured by their counterparts in the factories. The war with Japan 
also affected the peasant as soldiers were sent off to fight in the Far East, 
and the catalogue of defeats and deaths put doubts into the peasant mind as 
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to the competence of the regime to take care of its population. These 
pressures came on top of the economic hardship which was already being 
felt in the countryside and they combined to produce outbreaks of revolt 
and disturbances in many parts of European Russia. Peasants refused to 
accept decisions of the land captains, ‘landowners’ houses were sacked and 
their crops destroyed, but although there were over 3,000 separate incidents 
reported during the year, they did not develop into any kind of mass 
uprising against the government on the lines of the great peasant revolts of 
earlier centuries.16 
Nevertheless, these disturbances presented great problems for the 
government as they were concentrated into short periods of the year: most 
of the trouble took place in the spring, before sowing, and especially in the 
autumn, after the harvest was completed, so that the regime’s military and 
police resources were stretched to the limits. This situation was exacerbated 
by the continued absence of many of Russia’s crack troops in the Far East. 
Even though the war with Japan was over by mid-1905, it was difficult to 
transport troops back to European Russia with any speed along the still 
incomplete Trans-Siberian Railway. 
As the regime showed itself completely unwilling to meet the early 
demands for economic change, calls for political reform became louder and, 
as revolt became more widespread, the number of demands for political 
change as a prerequisite for economic change grew substantially. The 
articulation of political demands was made most forcibly and coherently by 
members of Russia’s educated elite who were able to voice their aspirations 
in ways which could not fail to be heard by the government. The main 
component of the programmes put forward by Russia’s embryonic political 
parties was for a legislative assembly on the West European pattern, elected 
on a very wide franchise, which would ensure that the Tsar could never 
again act in an arbitrary and despotic manner. As 1905 progressed the 
consensus outside the regime became stronger, so that the establishment of 
such an assembly was essential.17 
Inside the government, however, argument continued to rage about 
the wisdom of reform. The attitude of the emperor was crucial in 
determining the progress that reform could make. At the beginning of 
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February, the Tsar and his advisers met again to discuss the best methods of 
tackling the unrest that gripped Russia. Nicholas had ordered the new 
Minister of the Interior to prepare a decree laying the way open for the 
creation of a consultative assembly but, to the astonishment of most 
ministers, the first official declaration that emerged on 18 February was a 
manifesto reasserting the authority of the Russian autocracy.18 This was 
accompanied by a decree suggesting that the government would now take 
into consideration the views of individuals and organisations on legislation 
that was under discussion; a step towards the idea of a consultative 
assembly. Nicholas did not appear to recognise that these two declarations 
of government policy could be seen as contradictory and the emperor’s 
inability to comprehend the inconsistencies in his approach created further 
difficulties for his ministers and for the Russian state.19 
Discussions over the form that a consultative assembly would take 
occupied the first half of 1905. Bulygin had gained Nicholas’s approval to 
draft proposals without needing to take account of any views from outside 
the government. The documents that the Interior Minister presented for 
discussion in May 1905 proposed the establishment of a consultative State 
Duma that would scrutinise legislative proposals before they were formally 
discussed by the State Council. The new Duma was to be elected, but the 
franchise was to be based on property qualifications, thus severely limiting 
representation from the peasantry. Nicholas was deeply sceptical of 
anything that could be construed as placing limitations on his autocratic 
power, and he insisted that the new institution’s role should be confined to 
providing advice on legislative proposals. He wanted the Duma excluded 
from any part in the real work of government. In particular, the emperor 
insisted that he must retain the final say in determining the content of 
legislation and he rejected Bulygin’s proposal that legislation rejected by the 
Duma and State Council would be returned to ministers for their 
consideration. Nicholas wanted to retain his traditional role as the final 
judge of how Russia was governed.20 A further meeting took place at 
Peterhof in July to discuss Bulygin’s plans. Attended by ministers and 
members of the imperial family, together with a number of members of the 
existing State Council, the discussion centred on the abstruse point that the 
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emperor had identified: should the Tsar have the right to approve legislation 
that both Duma and State Council had rejected? This ran to the core of the 
process of reform: should the emperor’s power be limited in any way, or 
could the Tsar retain the prerogative to put any legislation into force, no 
matter whether the formal legislative institutions had approved it or not? 
Nicholas’s confusion and inconsistency came to the fore, when he agreed to 
side with the majority and conceded that, even though this was to be a 
consultative assembly, he would have to limit his powers and to abide by 
the decisions of Duma and State Council if they voted down legislation.21 
Even when the deliberations of the conference were concluded, the 
emperor continued to harbour doubts about the necessity of conceding a 
consultative assembly. Nicholas contemplated asking Bulygin to review the 
whole project again, and was prepared to delay the implementation of the 
new assembly for a further year.  
The offer of this purely consultative assembly was inadequate and 
failed to satisfy the pressures which had built up during the early part of 
1905. Disappointment with the concept of a consultative Duma was fuelled 
by detailed analysis of the cumbersome and complex electoral system that 
had been constructed. Elections were to be indirect and some sections of 
the population, such as industrial workers, were totally excluded from the 
suffrage. Discontent in both city and countryside continued to assail the 
regime. Strikes and rural discontent were accompanied by demonstrations in 
schools and universities. Meeting of all types of organisations took on a 
political character as groups as disparate as Old Believers and Kiev 
psychiatrists used their normal gatherings to voice political aspirations. It 
was plain that, far from dampening down political discussion, the 
proclamation of the Bulygin Duma had served to intensify pressure for 
change. The fact that the government had shown itself prepared to make 
some concessions seemed to demonstrate to society that, if further pressure 
was exerted, more concessions would be forthcoming. By the early autumn 
of 1905 it was obvious to much of the Russian elite that unless fundamental 
reforms were made to the institutional structure of the state, there was a 
serious possibility that the combined weight of urban and rural revolt would 
succeed in toppling the Tsarist regime.22 An already difficult situation was 
made much worse in the early autumn as a series of strikes gripped  
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St Petersburg and Moscow. It was not just industry that was affected: in the 
capital, telegraph operators, civil servants, shop staff and hospital employees 
all stopped working. Even staff at the State Bank voted to take strike action. 
By mid-October, Moscow had no electricity or gas supply, most shops were 
shut and water was available for only a few hours a day. This was the most 
serious crisis to hit the Russian regime and its gravity was plain even to the 
emperor. Nicholas wrote to his mother that 
 
the terrible quiet days began, quiet indeed because there was 
complete order in the streets, but everybody knew that something 
was being prepared - the troops were awaiting the signal...it was the 
same feeling as in summer before a thunderstorm.23 
 
It was evident that the concession of a consultative Duma had done 
nothing to quell discontent. More radical measures had to be contemplated. 
The Tsar was still not convinced that further reform was the best way to 
proceed. During the first half of October 1905, Nicholas considered the 
establishment of some form of military rule over the empire. He consulted 
with his senior military advisers about the practicality of taking such a 
drastic step, but their advice was unanimously against such a course of 
action, and even Trepov, the St Petersburg governor-general, recognised 
that reform was the only option open to the Tsarist regime. The complete 
lack of support amongst Nicholas’s closest advisers, for a policy of meeting 
the revolution with force, made up Nicholas’s mind. He wrote to Trepov 
on 16 October to thank him for his advice:  
 
It significantly eased the difficulty of making a final decision on the 
question of entering on the path of very broad reforms.( )Yes, Russia 
is being granted a constitution. There were not many of us who 
fought against it. But support in this struggle was to be found 
nowhere, every day an ever-larger number of people turned away 
from us, and in the end the inevitable happened.24 
 
The prime mover in pushing for fundamental reform was Sergei Witte. 
Freshly returned from his successful negotiation of a peace treaty with the 
Japanese, he was the man of the moment in the autumn of 1905. His 
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already impressive authority, acquired from his long and distinguished 
tenure of the Finance Ministry, was enormously enhanced by the way in 
which he had proved able to extricate Russia from this humiliating war. 
Witte, motivated as much by his own self-interest as by concern for the 
Russian state and its emperor, proposed to the Tsar a series of measures 
designed to satisfy as many of the demands for political change as possible 
without damaging the essential structure of the autocracy. Witte hoped that 
by establishing a full legislative assembly and by making promises to 
observe fundamental civil freedoms, the most vociferous and articulate of 
the critics of the regime would be appeased and would divert their energies 
into the new institutions and away from opposing the government.  
During October 1905, Witte worked hard to persuade the Tsar and 
his advisers that the only way forward was that of reform. His arguments 
were accepted by the middle of the month and, on 17 October 1905, 
resulted in the issuing of the October Manifesto, establishing a legislative 
Duma to take part in the work of governing Russia. This manifesto clearly 
signalled that the Russian autocracy had taken an irreversible step in 
allowing its subjects, for the first time, a formal say in the way in which the 
country was governed. The implications of this measure were wide-ranging 
and far from fully understood by the majority of those inside the regime 
who were to have to implement the new system. By giving the population 
of the Russian empire a permanent say in the way in which the country was 
governed, the state was ensuring that reform could never again disappear 
from the political agenda. 25 
The October Manifesto, however, showed signs of the tensions 
within the autocratic regime. It was formally entitled ‘On the improvement 
of order in the state’ and at the same time as it embraced the language of 
rights and representation, it stressed that the state would act to deal with 
outbreaks of disorder. The manifesto maintained an equivocal position, but 
the presence of elected representatives of the population meant that the 
regime could no longer easily impose its will on its subjects. By giving the 
population a formal place in government, the population of the empire 
would come to expect that its views would be taken into account and would 
not expect the government to act in direct opposition to its interests. At the 
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same time, and in a move that was motivated by Witte’s own concerns as 
much as by anything else, the Council of Ministers was restructured to 
provide proper cabinet government, with Witte, unsurprisingly, taking up its 
chairmanship and acting as Russia’s first prime minister. Witte did not 
endear himself to Nicholas II by acting as the prime mover in the 
preparation of the October Manifesto and in the establishment of a ‘united’ 
government. The emperor’s account of the events of mid-October to his 
mother showed very clearly how he felt that he had been pushed into 
making concessions, and that he was not reconciled to the establishment of 
a legislative Duma. ‘There was no other way left than to cross myself and to 
grant what everybody was asking for’ wrote the Tsar on 19 October.26  
The October Manifesto and the reform of the Council of Ministers 
represented the nadir of Nicholas II’s power. The emperor believed that he 
had been forced into making changes to the legislative structures of the 
Russian empire by ministers who had betrayed the essence of the Russian 
autocracy. He harboured a dislike for Witte that would endure until Witte’s 
death in 1915. Nicholas was never properly convinced of the need for 
reform, viewing it as a necessary evil and failing to understand that a 
reduction in his own autocratic power was both vital and irreversible. After 
1905, once a semblance of order had been restored to the empire, he sought 
to claw back the concessions that had been made by restricting the powers 
of the Duma and by taking steps to hedge the Duma about with limitations 
on its power with the reform of the State Council as the second legislative 
chamber. Nicholas II, for all his connections with the royal houses of 
Europe, had failed to learn the lessons of their history. He clung to the 
belief that Russia was exceptional and that it required a unique form of 
government, immune from the pressures that had forced the retreat of 
monarchical powers elsewhere in Europe.  
Nicholas looked to the past for his inspiration: the images of the 
monarchy that he selected for the 1913 Romanov tercentenary were from 
the seventeenth century.27 The last Russian Tsar, well-intentioned and with 
a deep sense of his own duty, was an essentially limited individual. He 
proved unable to provide leadership during 1905, instead being buffeted 
this way and that by his advisers. Unable to move towards the logical 
conclusion of his own favoured approach and to establish a military 
                                                          
26 ‘Perepiska Nikolaia II’, Krasnyi Arkhiv 22 (1927) 169. 
27 Richard Wortman, Scenarios of power: myth and ceremony in Russian monarchy, II 
(Princeton 2000) 445-447. 




dictatorship in Russia, yet fundamentally unwilling to embrace reform, 
Nicholas II’s behaviour during 1905 demonstrated his essential weakness, as 
both a ruler and as an individual, and presaged his overthrow a dozen years 
later. 
